Sisters and Brothers,

Below is the NLFL’s news release responding to the Transportation Safety Board’s report on the crash of Cougar Flight 491. Seventeen workers died from the March 2009 crash.

TSB’s recommendations must be implemented, NLFL calls on Transport Canada and CNLOPB to act immediately

The Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour (NLFL) is calling for the full implementation of the Transportation Safety Board’s recommendations based on its investigation into the crash of Cougar Flight 491.

NLFL President Lana Payne said we need to ensure helicopters transporting workers to the offshore have adequate dry-run capability which may be longer than 30 minutes. “The federal government and Transport Canada must move immediately to implement the recommendations of the TSB.”

In the meantime, Ms. Payne said the CNLOPB, as the regulator for the offshore, should require a 30-minute dry run capability until the broader assessment is completed by the Federal Aviation Administration regarding whether 30 minutes is sufficient.

Extra steps must also be taken to ensure the safety of workers, including a permanent ban on night flights and a ban on flights in sea states that prevent safe ditching and successful evacuations.

The labour leader said she expects Commissioner Robert Wells will examine these matters in his second report for the C-NLOPB, “but in the meantime the TSB report certainly confirms why an independent, powerful offshore safety authority with helicopter expertise is desperately needed.”

While there are 16 factors which either caused the crash or contributed to the loss of these workers’ lives, “I think it is also fair to question just how much the role profit and the bottom line play in decision-making and just how much more vigilant we need our regulators to be, especially those regulators charged with the safety of workers.”

Ms. Payne said the stunning revelations in yesterday’s Transportation Safety Board report raise many questions, including why this helicopter was certified without 30-minute dry run capability even though that was the standard the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was said to be seeking.

The TSB report notes that the FAA had wanted civilian aircraft to meet the 30-minute dry-run capability that was already in place for military helicopters. But the S-92 failed that dry-run test. It was at that time that the manufacturer and the FAA reviewed the rules and decided with some changes to the gearbox cooling system, the possibility of a total oil loss was “extremely remote.”

The TSB reported that the S-92 is the only helicopter to be certified using the “extremely remote” provision and these are the helicopters that were purchased to operate in what has been described as “the most difficult operational environment in the offshore helicopter world” (Wells report – page 59).

The facts of this tragedy are that 17 workers died, and if just one of 16 factors was different, these workers may very well be alive today.

“Sixteen factors! That is a lot of things going wrong and every single one of them speaks to why we need a powerful, independent safety agency regulating health and safety in the offshore as was recommended by Commissioner Wells in his report last fall,” said Ms. Payne. “What we don’t need is what we have had: a too cozy relationship between the operators and the regulator and too little attention paid to the concerns of workers.”

If anything, the TSB report confirms Commissioner Wells’ conclusions and recommendations, including recommendation number 27 which says our offshore regulator must be funded and involved in studies and research on offshore helicopter safety locally and in other jurisdictions.

What is equally unpardonable and supports the need for a powerful safety authority is the fact these workers did not have underwater-breathing apparatuses. The TSB has confirmed that the chances of survival for the 17 workers who died were seriously diminished because they did not have the apparatuses.

This issue of underwater-breathing apparatuses was raised during the Wells Inquiry by lawyer Randell Earle who represented the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers union and its members working offshore at the Inquiry.

The discussion about these devices was first raised in 2000 by the CNLOPB with the operators. “Nine years later, workers in the offshore still were not equipped with them. It was not until the crash of Cougar Flight 491 and the death of 17 workers that this was acted on and yet what we heard yesterday confirmed that had the regulator been more vigilant, had the companies operating in our offshore acted as those did in the North Sea and Norway, it may very well have made a difference.”

This is not about hindsight. “This is about the delay tactics we see all too often when the issue is making improvements for the health and safety of workers,” said Ms. Payne. “This is exactly why we need a vigilant, independent and powerful regulator.”

Ms. Payne said the TSB report also confirms that the health and safety rights of offshore workers, including the right to know, have been consistently violated.